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TRESPASSING CHILDREN IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Introduction'
In determining the duty owed by the owner or occupier of
land to persons thereon, the law divides the latter into three cate-
gories-invitees, licensees, and trespassers.
An invitee is one who enters upon the land by invitation either
expressed or implied. A typical example is a customer in a
store.2 The duty of the owner or occupier is to protect invitees
not only against dangers of which he knows, but also from those
which with reasonable care he might discover.3
A licensee is one who is permitted to enter with consent but
nothing more. He comes for his own purposes rather than for
an interest of the possessor of the land, and generally takes the
premises as he finds them. Typical examples are social visitors,4
those soliciting money for charities, 5 and persons making per-
missive use of crossings or ways.6 There the occupier is only
under a duty to warn of traps or concealed dangers of which
he has knowledge.7
A trespasser is one who is neither suffered nor invited to enter.
The duty of the possessor of the land is merely to refrain from
wilful or wanton injury.8 He is a wrongdoer who has no right
to expect or demand that he be provided with a safe place in
which to trespass.9 However over the years three minor excep-
tions to this general rule have been recognized.10 First, when the
occupier sees a trespasser heading for a concealed danger, he
must at least give a warning. Second, he will be liable to one
who deviates either inadvertently 2 or intentionally 3 from a
1. It is beyond the scope of this article to give, except in a most cursory
manner, the general law on the subject.
2. See, e.g., Baker v. Clark, 233 S.C. 20, 103 S.E.2d 395 (1958).
3. See generally 38 Am. JUR. Negligence §§ 96-103 (1941).
4. Cesario v. Chiapparine, 21 App. Div. 2d 272, 250 N.Y.S.2d 584 (App.
Div. 1964).
5. Jones v. Asa G. Candler, Inc., 22 Ga. App. 717, 97 S.E. 112 (1918).
6. Smiley v. Southern Ry., 184 S.C. 130, 191 S.E. 895 (1935).
7. 38 Am. JuR. Negligence §§ 104-08 (1941).
8. Refers to malfeasance, or active misconduct.
9. See generally 38 AM. JuR. Negligence §§ 109-15 (1941).
10. See Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. Rav. 427, 428-29
(1959).
11. Kershaw Motor Co. v. Southern Ry., 136 S.C. 377, 134 S.E. 377 (1925).
12. Humphries v. Union & Glenn Springs R.R., 84 S.C. 202, 65 S.E. 1051
(1909).
13. Sawicki v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 129 Conn. 626, 30 A.2d
556 (1943).
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public highway for a purpose connected with travel, and who
is injured by a condition which constitutes a foreseeable, un-
reasonable risk of harm in the event of deviation. Third, a few
cases have imposed liability where, with knowledge, there is a
frequent trespass upon a small and highly dangerous area of
land.14 Apart from these the adult trespasser takes the land as
he finds it.
When the trespasser is a child, one important basis for this
general rule may be lacking, that being that the child may be
unable to appreciate the danger to which he is subjecting himself
when he enters upon premises where there are dangerous con-
ditions. The primary duty for his safety and protection must
be borne by his parents. It is, however, "obviously neither cus-
tomary nor practicable for them to follow him around with a
keeper, or chain him to the bedpost."'15 In order to effectuate the
admittedly basic public interest in the safety and welfare of
children most courts have placed the burden of minimal protec-
tion upon the one who can most easily provide it-the one upon
whose land he trespasses.
The duty of reasonable care most commonly is applied under
the ineptly named'0 "attractive nuisance doctrine". 17 This doc-
trine is directly opposed to the legitimate interest of the land-
owner in the free use of his premises for his own purposes. As the
most basic point of reference in this area, the cases show a con-
scious effort on the part of the courts to compromise these con-
flicting interests, neither allowing the owner to ignore an ob-
vious danger to infants, nor placing him in the position of an
insurer.'
B. History
The English case of Lynol v. Nurdin,'9 where a child was
injured while playing with a negligently loaded cart left unat-
tended on a public way, is the first case indicating that there is
14. Cornucopia Gold Miner v. Lacken, 150 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1945).
15. PnossER, ToRTs § 59 at 372 (3d ed. 1964).
16. Nuisance generally applies only to injury to persons or land beyond
the wrongdoer's borders.
17. Nuisance because it is an unreasonable use under the circumstances by
the possessor of land, and attractive because in some early cases it was thought
to be necessary that the child be attracted on the land in order to find a basis
for the implied invitation fiction. 32 IND. L. J. 75 (1956).
18. BOHEN, ToRTs 191-92 (1926).
19. 1 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
[Vol. 17
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a special rule for trespassing children. The attractive nuisance
doctrine as such cannot be said to have been formalized in Lord
Denman's decision which is based primarily on contributory
negligence. 20 However, it is the case most frequently cited as the
origin of the doctrine.
2 1
Another case sometimes cited as the primary English authority
is Townsend v. Wathen.2 2 In this case the plaintiff's dogs were
enticed into Wathen's traps by the smell of the bait placed in
them. Lord Ellenborough said that everyone must be taken to
consider the probable consequences of his acts, and that there
was no difference in drawing the animals there by an instinct
beyond their control and placing them there by force. However,
the use of this case as authority for the doctrine was criticized
in -Walker's Admr ,v. Potomao F. & P. R.R.,23 the court stating
that in the Townsend case the defendant's actions were inten-
tional and for a malicious purpose and had nothing whatever to
do with negligence.
24
It is of interest to note that the English courts have never
specifically recognized the attractive nuisance doctrine, although
some cases show great liberality in finding license or implied
invitation.
25
The leading case in this country in support of the doctrine is
Sioux City & Pao. R.R. V. Stout.26 In this case recovery was
allowed in the district court to a six-year-old boy who was in-
jured while playing with the defendant's turntable. The Supreme
Court affirmed with little relevant discussion. Following this
decision were many others by other courts in which trespassing
infants were injured while playing with railroad turntables,
the cases becoming so common that for a time the tort was
called the "turntable doctrine".
2 7
20. Also, while some courts that ordinarily reject the doctrine, apply it to
cases where a child is injured in a place where he has a right to be; others
accepting it as to trespassers to land, reject it in cases of injury in a public
way. Annot., 36 A.L.R. 37, 66 (1925).
21. See, e.g., 84 Vt. 370, 79 Atl. 858 (1911).
22. 9 East 277, 103 Eng. Rep. 579 (1808). See Annot., 36 A.L.R. 34, 49
(1925).
23. 105 Va. 226, 53 S.E. 113 (1906).
24. The analogy is rather obvious however.
25. Prosser, supra note 10, at 430.
26. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
27. Smith, Liability of Landowners To Children Entering Without Per-
mission, 11 HA.v. L. REv. 349, 434 (1898).
1965]
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In United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. BTitt,28 Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the majority, held that where two children were
killed when they went into clear but poisoned water in the base-
ment of defendant's abandoned building there could be no recov-
ery since they had not been attracted on to the land by the dan-
gerous condition. The case turns on the fact that the Court
adopted the implied invitation theory. The invitation is said to
come from the condition being attractive to children. It follows
that if the condition cannot be apprehended from a place where
the children have a right to be, there is no invitation, and the
children are thereby in the same position as adult trespassers.
This boon to the defense attorney has apparently been overruled
by the Supreme Court in Best v. District of Columbia9 and is
presently followed only in seven states.30
Justification for the special rule for trespassing children on
basic tort principles rather than allurement, while not entirely
dormant in the early development of the doctrine, 81 was given
great impetus in the early twenties by Green 32 and Hudson.
33
The duty imposed upon landowners had as its basis common
humanity. The enticement requirement was abandoned, and was
given importance only as a factor bearing on foreseeability, as
was the fact that the child was a trespasser.
By 1925, of some thirty-four states where the issue had been
raised, the cases were about evenly divided between those re-
jecting and those accepting special consideration for trespassing
children. 4 Of the former, the classic denunciation of the policy
is in Ryan v. Towar.3 5 After a thorough analysis of the cases
favoring the doctrine, the court concluded that the decisions
could not be supported by the common law, and that however
"Draconic" the common law rule might be, such a broad change
28. 258 U.S. 268 (1921).
29. 291 U.S. 411 (1934). See Eastburn v. Levin, 113 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir.
1940).
30. Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina,
and Tennessee. PROSSER, TORTS § 59 at 374 (3d ed. 1964). The inclusion of
South Carolina is doubtful.
31. 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABLITY 160-61 (1906).
32. See Green, Landowner v. Intruder: Intruder v. Landowner: The Basis
of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MicE. L. REv. (1923).
33. Hudson, The Turntable Doctrine In The Federal Courts, 36 HRv. L.
REv. 826 (1923).
34. See Annot., 36 A.L.R. 34 (1925).
35. 128 Mich. 463, 87 N.W. 644 (1901). The doctrine has since been
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could only be effectuated by the legislature. At the present time
only seven states36 refuse to recognize any distinction between
trespassing children and adult trespassers. Added to these, New
York applies it only in exceptional cases 3 7 and Virginia and
West Virginia have developed their own rule, "dangerous instru-
mentalities", from which basically the same result follows.
38 It
must be noted however that the tendency has been with most
courts to narrow its application rather than extend it. 39
C. General Law
To state that the American decisions which accept the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine are in a state of confusion practically
defying rational classification is a vast understatement. Such a
result is not surprising, however, when the reasons for such con-
fusion are considered. Besides the obvious dichotomy of interests
between the trespassing child and the landowner, the reasons
are twofold: first, a strong judicial fear of overly sympathetic
juries; and second, the multitude of theories and fictions (and
their resulting implications) that are employed to avoid the fact
that the child is a trespasser to whom no duty is ordinarily owed.
The first factor can best be exemplified by examining the
nature and kind of conditions to which attempts have been made,
sometimes with success and sometimes not, to apply the doc-
trine.40 Of course, not every object that may prove an object for
childhood curiosity amounts to an attractive nuisance. The dis-
tinction is generally made between those objects or conditions
which are latently or patently dangerous, recovery being allowed
for latent dangers only. Latent in this regard means a condition
which a child cannot be expected to understand, the question
being not whether the child did appreciate the peril but whether
he could be expected to by the landowner.41 Common examples
of patent dangers-those which the landowner is free to assume
36. Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island,
and Vermont. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 427, 433
(1959).
37. Id. at 433-34.
38. Id. at 434-35. See White v. Kanawha City Co., 34 S.E.2d 17, 127
W. Va. 566 (1945).
39. 38 Am. JuL. § 144 at 805 (1941).
40. For an exhaustive treatment from Abutments to Wrecks, see Annot.,
36 A.L.R. 34, 155-292 (1925) ; supplemented by 39 A.L.R. 486, 487-90 (1925) ;
45 A.L.R. 982, 987-93 (1926); 53 A.L.R. 1344, 1352-1356 (1928); and 60
A.L.R. 1444, 1451-55 (1929).
41. Prosser, supra note 36, at 455-56.
19651 NoTs
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that a child as a matter of law will understand-are bodies of
water, fire, heights, moving machinery and vehicles, and excava-
tions.42 It is also often said that for the doctrine to apply the
article must be artificial, uncommon, special, or unusual.43 These
criteria, however, are for the most part very arbitrary, since,
for example, the assumption that a three-year-old child will
recognize the dangers of a wading pool could certainly not be
based upon experience.
As to the second reason there are some six theories which have
been recognized as a basis for liability :4
(1). It has been suggested, based on the case of Townsend v.
TVathen,45 that the owner will be considered to have intended
the injury to the trespassing child on the theory that one will
be held to have intended the proximate consequences of his acts.
This reasoning blurs the distinction between negligence and in-
tentional misconduct. Also the Oklahoma court in Shawnee 'v.
Cheek40 said that it is absurd to imply such intent where clearly
it does not exist.
(2). The Oklahoma decisions, in an attempt to reconcile the
special rule toward child trespassers with settled law, hold that
failure to take reasonable precautions for the safety of children
whose presence may be anticipated amounts to wantonness. 47
It does seem odd that this court, while rejecting an unreasonable
extention of implied intent, finds no hindrance in doing just
that to the normal conception of what constitutes wanton
conduct.
(3). A theory sometimes applied is that the doctrine is an
exception to the rule that the owner of property owes no duty
to keep his property safe for trespassers, where he maintains
something in the nature of a trap or concealed danger known
to him and as to which he gave no warning to others.48
(4). In some cases the doctrine has been based on the maxim
sio utere tuo ut alienum non laedas-one must use his property
42. Prosser, supra note 36, at 456-57.
43. 38 Am. JuR. § 150 (1941).
44. See Annot., 36 AL.R. 34, 109-22 (1925); supplemented by 45 A.L.R.
982, 985-86 (1926). 53 A.L.R. 1344, 1349 (1928); and 60 A.L.R. 1444, 1448
(1929). The following is a brief summation with comments.
45. 9 East 277, 103 Eng. Rep. 579 (1808).
46. 41 Okla. 227, 137 Pac. 724 (1913).
47. Ibid.
48. See Taylor v. Great Eastern Quick-Silver Mining Co., 45 Cal. App.
194, 187 Pac. 101 (Dist. Ct. App. 1919).
[Vol. 17
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss3/4
so as not to harm others.49 This theory, however, offers little in
the way of an explanation of the doctrine or criteria for its
application. For example, why under this theory should the land-
owner be liable to children and not to adults?
(5). A far more commonly accepted theory is that the attrac-
tiveness of the dangerous condition is to be considered as an
implied invitation which takes the child out of the category of
trespassers and places him in the category of invitees. As to the
latter category the landowner owes the duty of ordinary care.50
This theory of implied invitation is criticized mainly for the
reason that logically it could bemade to apply to any attractive
condition, thereby ignoring the distinction between temptation
and invitation, and further that it is at best a mere fiction at
variance with the owner's actual intent.5 1 Also, stressing attrac-
tiveness and the necessity for invitation often leads to arbitrary
results. For example, it is unjust for a land owner to be free of
duty merely because a dangerous condition which he maintains
may be hidden from view at the borders of his property and at
the same time to impose liability on another landowner whose
property is far less likely to be trespassed upon but where the
dangerous condition is more easily apprehended.
(6). Because of his tender years, a child is not a trespasser,
and the landowner must use reasonable care for his protection. 2
Of course, merely holding that a child is not a trespasser logi-
cally does nothing toward developing any standard for the
doctrine.
The majority of courts now reject or avoid attempts at tech-
nical clarification, preferring to base the doctrine on public
policy and to impose a duty when the basis of all tort liability
is present-foreseeability of harm. In what Dean Prosser has
called "perhaps its most effective single section,"5 3 the Restate-
ment of Torts54 is the best available statement of the rule as pres-
ently applied:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm
to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure
or artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if
49. See Bjork v. Tacoma, 76 Wash. 225, 135 Pac. 1005 (1913).
50. See, e.g., Price v. Atchinson Water Co., 58 Kan. 551, 50 Pac. 450 (1897).
51. Turess v. New York S. & W. R.R., 61 NJ.L. 314, 40 At. 614 (Sup. Ct.
1898).
52. Hardy v. Missouri & Pac. R.R., 266 Fed. 860 (8th Cir. 1920).
53. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 427, 435 (1959). This
article contains an excellent analysis and criticism of the Restatement position.
54. RrSTATEmSENT, TORTS § 339 (1934).
1965] No _n
7
Taylor: Trespassing Children in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1964
SouTH CAnoLiIA LAW RL-mW
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one
upon which the possessor knows or should know that such
children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or
should know and which he realizes or should realize as in-
volving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm
to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover
the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling
in it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condi-
tion is slight as compared to the risk to young children
therein.
D. South Carolina Cases°5
The case of Bridger v. Asheville and Spartanburg R.R.56 is
the first case in South Carolina indicating that there is a special
rule for infant trespassers. The court based its decision purely
on negligence, and the only reference made to the fact that the
child was a trespasser was the holding that the trial judge prop-
erly charged the jury that, if the defendant's turntable was
located in a place where persons were not likely to go, it was
not bound to take precautions against possible injury to tres-
passers. There was evidence that the turntable was dangerous,
located in an exposed place, easily accessible, unfenced, un-
guarded, and unlocked. As an eleven year old child the plaintiff
was of an age where he could not understand that the turntable
was dangerous and that he had no right to meddle with it.
Therefore there was sufficient evidence of negligence for the
jury.
The court correctly stated the general rule concerning the
weight which should be given to evidence of custom: the mere
fact that others throughout the country in the same position as
the defendant exercise no higher degree of care did not as a
matter of law shield him from the duty to exercise reasonable
55. The application of the doctrine to municipal corporations is beyond the
scope of this article. See Williams v. City of Sumter, 149 S.C. 375, 147 S.E.
321 (1927) ; Morris v. Langley Mills, 121 S.C. 200, 113 S.E. 632 (1920) ; Haith-
cock v. City of Columbia, 115 S.C. 29, 104 S.E. 335 (1919) ; Stone v. City of
Florence, 94 S.C. 375, 78 S.E. 23 (1913) ; and Irvine v. Town of Greenwood,
89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911). See generally 38 Am. JUL MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS §588 (1941).
56. 25 S.C. 24 (1885). See also Bridger v. Asheville & Spartanburg R.R.,
27 S.C. 456, 3 S.E. 860 (1887) (action by father for his damages).
[Vol. 17
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prudence under the circumstances. 57 Also it was held that as
the child was only eleven years of age, the trial judge could not
charge as a matter of law that he was sui juris. The question of
whether or not he was of sufficient age, intelligence, and dis-
cretion to be brought within the rule of contributory negligence
was for the jury.
In Franks v. Southern Cotton Oil Co.58 the issue before the
court was whether or not the principles expressed in the Bridger
case 59 were applicable to things other than turntables. The court
held that recovery could be allowed for the death of a nine-year-
old boy who drowned in an unguarded reservoir which was
maintained for business purposes in an open field near the streets
and residences of the city, and where, with the knowledge of the
defendant, children often played. Mir. Justice Gary did not dis-
cuss directly the specific issue in the case; but rather his opinion
contains a number of quotations from authorities who, while
accepting the view that there should be a special exception made
for trespassing children, do so for different reasons, among them
are the following:
(1) The owners and occupiers of real property are held by
the law in some respects to a different standard of liability,
in case of injuries to children, coming upon their premises,
from that under which they stand with respect to adult per-
sons. It is believed that the following propositions may safe-
ly be stated to be the law: (1) The owner or occupier of real
property stands under the same duty to children, who are
expressly or impliedly invited to come upon his premises, in
respect of keeping such premises safe, to the end that they
will not be injured in so coming, under which he stands to
adult persons. (2) As a general rule, he is not bound to keep
his premises safe, or in particular condition, for the benefit
of the trespassing children of his neighbors, or for the bene-
fit of children who occupy no more favorable position than
that of bare licensees. (3) A well-grounded eeception to
the foregoing principles, is that one who artifically brings
or creates upon his own premises, any dangerous thing which
from its nature has a tendency to attract the childish in-
stincts of children to play with it is bound, as a mere matter
57. See Annot, 68 A.L.R. 1400, 1408-09 (1930).
58. 78 S.C. 10, 58 S.E. 960 (1907).
59. 25 S.C. 24 (1885). The United States Supreme Court had extended the
doctrine in Union Pac. Ry. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262 (1894).
1965] NOTES
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of social duty, to take such reasonable precautions as the cir-
cumstances admit of, to the end that they may be protected
from injury while so playing with it, or coming in its
vicinity.O
(2) We now come to a class of decisions which hold the land-
owner liable in damages in the case of children injured by
dangerous things suffered to exist unguarded on his prem-
ises, where they are accustomed to come with or without
license. These decisions proceed on one or the other of two
grounds: (1) That where the owner or occupier of grounds
brings or artificially creates something thereon which from
its nature is especially attractive to children, and which at
the same time is dangerous to them, he is bound, in the exer-
cise of social duty and the ordinary offices of humanity, to
take reasonable pains to see that such dangerous things are
so guarded that children will not be injured by coming in
contact with them. (2) That although the dangerous thing
may not be what is termed an attractive nuisance-that is to
say, may not have especial attraction for children by reason
of their childish instincts-yet where it is so left exposed
that they are likely to come in contact with it, and where
their coming in contact with it is obviously dangerous to
them, the person so exposing the dangerous thing should
reasonably anticipate the injury that is likely to happen to
them from its being so exposed, and is bound to take reason-
able pains to guard it, so as to prevent injury to them.61
(3) Liability in the turntable cases is strictly put upon
the ground of implied invitation to children to come upon
the premises in order to play there, the invitation being sup-
posed to arise from the attractive nature of these dangerous
engines. This hypothesis is hatched up to evade the obstacle
which arises from the fact that the plaintiff is a trespasser.
But it is unnecessary, as it is inadequate and artificial. Lia-
bility is to be ascribed to the simple fact that the defendant,
in maintaining a dangerous agent from which harm may,
under peculiar conditions, be expected to come, has the pri-
mary risk, and must answer in damages, unless a counter
60. 78 S.C. 10, 14-15, 58 S.E. 960, 961 (1907): quoting from 1 THomPsoN,
NEGLIGENCE § 1024 (1901).
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assumption of risk can be imposed on those who go there
to play.
6 2
(4) In the case of young children, and other persons not
sui june, an implied license might sometimes arise, when it
would not in behalf of others. Thus, leaving a tempting thing
to play with exposed where they would be likely to gather
for that purpose may be equivalent to an invitation to them
to make use of it.63
After this exercise in legal research, Mr. Justice Gary held that
the court preferred "to follow the doctrine based upon humanity
and the wholesome maxim, 'Sio utere tuo ut non alienum
Zaedas.' 84 It appears that he concluded that the maxim ex-
pressed the basic assumption behind the reasoning in the quota-
tions given above.
In the cases that follow the Franks decision there is an under-
lying current of confusion as to just what this case held, especial-
ly whether or not implied invitation was necessary for liability
to be imposed.
In Hayes v. Southern Power Co.65 recovery was allowed to a
nine-year-old boy who was injured when he reached into an open
window and came in contact with electric wires. The building in
question was on property which the child had permission to enter
in order to attend school, but he had been warned not to go near
the building. It was stated that whether or not the open window
was an attractive nuisance was for the jury in view of the fact
that there was evidence that the child had been told if he would
reach inside and take hold of the wires, he would see interesting
things. The quotations in the Frank case 6 from Cooley6 7 in ref-
erence to maintaining an enticing condition as tantamount to
an expressed invitation and Thompson6 criticising the view that
a trespassing child can only recover if the injury was wantonly
inflicted were contended to be dictum by Southern. The Court
rejected Southern's contention and cited the quotations with
approval.
62. Id. at 15-16, 58 S.E. at 961; quoting from 1 STREE, FouNDATioNs OF
LEGAL LIABILITY 160-61 (1906).
63. Id. at 16, 58 S.E. at 961-62; quoting from CooLEY, ToRTs, p. 624 [sic]
COOLEY, ToRTs 356 (2d ed. 1888).
64. Id. at 19, 58 S.E. at 963.
65. 95 S.C. 230, 78 S.E. 956 (1913).
66. Franks v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 78 S.C. 10, 58 S.E. 960 (1907).
67. COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 63.
68. 1 THouPsoN, op. cit. supra note 61, § 1026.
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The Tucker v. Clinton Cotton Mills decision69 is not at all
clear. In this case, Roy Tucker, a fourteen year old employee of
the mill, drowned in the mill pond which was filled at the time
with scalding water either while playing with his younger
brother or attempting to save the latter after he fell in the pond.
While not mentioned as such the plaintiff's action seems to be
based on attractive nuisance. The mill defended on the ground
of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk, both as
to Roy and his mother, the plaintiff. While conceding that there
was some evidence to support the defendant's allegation, the
court without elaboration held that there was sufficient counter
evidence to go to the jury.
In McLendon v. Hampton Cotton Mills"t the plaintiff's son, a
child six years of age, was drowned while wading in the mill
pond. The issue was the extent of care owed by the landowners.
Mr. Justice Hydrick, speaking for the majority, held that where
the pond was fenced, the child had been warned of the danger
by his father, and the company watchmen drove out all who
were seen within the enclosure, the mill had performed its duty.
He stated that the rule adopted in the Franks case7 ' was
based upon the just and humane principal that one who
creates upon his own premises a thing which is naturally
attractive to children and at the same time dangerous to
them, or which, although it may not be especially attractive
to them, yet if left exposed where they are likely to come
in contact with it, and their doing so is frought with obvious
danger to them, should anticipate their childish proclivities
and exercise reasonable care to safeguard them from injury
that otherwise would probably result.7 2
He stated, however, that the rule only placed a reasonable burden
on the landowner. The purpose of the special exception is to safe-
guard the child of normal instincts and training, and that,
therefore, the possessor of land is not required to erect a barrier
which no child can overcome. To rule otherwise would be an
unreasonable burden on the landowner and would in effect place
69. 95 S.C. 302, 78 S.E. 890 (1912). See also Tucker v. Clinton Cotton Mills,
96 S.C. 466, 81 S.E. 182 (1914) (recovery for death of other brother allowed).
70. 109 S.C. 238, 95 S.E. 78 (1917) (3-to-2 decision).
71. Franks v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 78 S.C. 10, 58 S.E. 960 (1907).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss3/4
him in the category of an insurer.7 3 The fact in this case that the
fence was broken in some areas, while indicative of some negli-
gence, was not the proximate cause of the injury for the reason
that the child climbed over a section in good repair.
Mr. Justice Gage, dissenting, expressed the opinion that a child
of six was incapable of contributory negligence and of observing
danger. To him an easily climbed fence was more of an invitation
than a hindrance. He stated that although the fence complied
with the letter of the law, it was not in accord with its spirit,
and that therefore the case should have gone to the jury to de-
termine whether or not the pond was reasonably safe.
Sexton v. Noll Constr. Co.7 4 is the most confusing decision on
this topic. In this case an infant under seven was burned when
the spout on an asphalt boiler fell out as he was walking by on
his way to play in a sand pile some one hundred feet away. The
court restated again the view that a dangerous object need not
be attractive, but that a duty also arose where a condition was
so exposed that children were likely to come in contact with it,
and such contact would be obviously dangerous.75 The court,
however, held that a verdict should have been directed for the
defendant even though the company may have been negligent
to some degree in not properly maintaining the spout, because
such negligence was not the proximate cause7" of the injury.
The court reasoned that the defendant was only required to
anticipate and safeguard against dangers which related to con-
tact by children while pursuing their youthful amusement.
7 7
The plaintiff, however, was not playing with, or influenced by,
the boiler in any way, but was merely passing by it. While it was
true that but for the defective spout the injury would not have
occurred, it was not an obvious danger from which harm was
reasonably foreseeable.
It could be said from the wording of this opinion that the
court is adopting the implied invitation theory to deny liability.
The case does not so hold. From where would the invitation
come if the condition were not attractive ? It is, however, diffi-
73. See generally 38 Am. JuR. Negligence § 147 (1941). There is no duty
to take precautions which would be impracticable, unreasonable, or intolerable.
No matter what the degree of foreseeability of harm, there would be no duty
to surround Lake Murray with a fence.
74. 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1918).
75. It should be noted that "obvious" modifies dangerous, while "likely"
modifies contact.
76. See generally 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 152 (1941).
77. See generally 38 Am. Jun. Negligence § 146 (1941).
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cult to follow the court's conclusion that injury was unforesee-
able under the dangerous contact criteria. There was no require-
ment expressed in the Franks case78 that a child be influenced
by a dangerous condition but merely that harmful contact was
likely. Because of the nature of the condition in issue in this case,
and especially its close proximity to where a number of children
found amusement, the case should have gone to the jury.
In Renno v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.,9 a boy nine years of age
was drowned in a pool of water on the railroad's right-of-way
which was created during periods of heavy rain by water rush-
ing out of a small culvert. During such periods the "wash hole"
was some fifty by twenty-two feet and about six feet in depth.
During normal weather conditions the "wash" was much smaller
and at times was filled with sand. Mr. Chief Justice Gary, speak-
ing for the majority, stated that the only difference in this sit-
uation and that in the Franks case80 was that in the latter the
reservoir was used by the defendant; but here it had no use, and
the pond was not dangerous at all times. Again Thompson"' was
cited, but more important the Street"2 quotation criticizing the
implied invitation fiction was repeated. The court, however, did
not discuss the latter.
Mr. Justice Gary (Circuit Judge) in a concurring opinion
stressed one point mentioned in the McLendon case83 that the
locality of the nuisance, whether or not in a populous or sparcely
settled area, was only one of many elements bearing on foresee-
ability.
4
In a well written dissent, Mr. Justice Cothran stated that this
case should be distinguished from the other South Carolina cases
mainly on the grounds that the pool was a fortuitous circum-
stance unrelated to business and was not located in a public
place.85 It is rather obvious from reading his opinion that he
felt that the doctrine should not apply to drowning situations
at all.
The attractiveness of the pool: It is but speaking to the
common experience of every man who is blessed with the
78. Franks v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 78 S.C. 10, 58 S.E. 960 (1907).
79. 120 S.C. 7, 112 S.E 439 (1922) (concurring and dissenting opinions).
80. Franks v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 78 S.C. 10, 58 S.E. 960 (1907).
81. 1 THomfPsou, NEGLIGENCE §§ 1024, 1026 (1901).
82. 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 160-61 (1906).
83. McLendon v. Hampton Cotton Mills, 109 S.C. 238, 95 S.E. 781 (1917).
84. Renno v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 120 S.C. 7, 31, 112 S.E. 439, 447 (1922).
85. Id. at 37, 112 S.E. at 449.
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memories of his youth to recall that nothing in the range
of youthful amusements possesses the alurements of the
"wash hole" to the small boy, shedding his scant raiment as
he runs to plunge into its cooling waters. (It is a strange
contradiction of his nature that he suffers from "hydro-
phobia" as to every other form of ablution). The allurement
is so universal and so irresistible, and appeals so strongly
to those who remember happier days, that it would be churl-
ish in the extreme to fence in and run the youthful depre-
dators out of every "hole" that chanced to be deeper than
the small boy's well-known standard. It surmounts every
obstacle of dog, bull, or fence, and would require the pres-
ence of guards at every place, whether natural channel or
fortuitous creation, on farm or right of way, deep enough
to drown a boy.8 6
It should be noted that the majority of courts which accept
a special rule toward children refuse to apply it to water haz-
ards, thus agreeing at least in result with Mr. Justice Cothran.
While the reasons for this limitation are many and varied they
may be summarized by saying that in the absence of some un-
usual circumstance, such as a hidden trap or some special at-
tracting feature, such hazards are considered patent rather than
latent.87
With a very brief opinion in Pigford v. Cherokee Falls Mfg.
Co., 8 the court held that the circuit court was correct in not
directing a verdict in favor of the defendant where there was
evidence that the company maintained a reservoir on its prem-
ises that was alluring to immature children, known to be dan-
gerous, and insufficiently safeguarded.
Hart v. Union Mfg. & Power Co. 9 is the most informative
case in South Carolina on liability for infant trespassers. The
court held that where an eight-year-old child was electrocuted
when he climbed a transmission tower, whether or not the tower
was an attractive nuisance was for the jury. Also it was held
that the evidence was sufficient to allow an award for punitive
damages. There were a number of factors considered by the
court. One, the tower was of a ladder-like construction which
could easily be climbed and in fact had been made that way for
86. Id. at 36, 112 S.E. at 448-49.
87 See Annot., 8 A.L.R. 2d 1258 (1949).
88. 124 S.C. 389, 117 S.E. 419 (1923) (nine years old).
89. 157 S.C. 174, 154 S.E. 118 (1930) (dissenting opinion by Cothran, J.
based on necessity for implied invitation).
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easy maintenance. Two, the condition could have easily been
abated with an inexpensive wire enclosure; or a regular power
pole without climbing fixtures at the bottom could have been
used in the first place. And three, the area and the tower itself
had been a regular place of amusement for the children of the
milltown for many years. Mr. Justice Blease, speaking for the
majority, said also that the determining factor in attractive
nuisance is not that it be located so that it may be easily reached,
but that it is sufficient that it be of such a character as to tempt
a normal venturesome child, so that it may be easily put in reach.
The case is most important for its summation of the prior
history of attractive nuisance in the state which is actually a
composite of the trial judge's charge, but which Mr. Justice
Blease said expressed the clearly sanctioned doctrine in this state.
I. That children, wherever they go, must be expected to act
upon childish instincts and impulses, and if any dangerous
thing or instrumentality is maintained and exposed to the
observation of children by the owner of premises, of such
character and in such form as to tempt, appeal to, and at-
tract the normal child in play and amusement, and which
they, in their immature judgment, might naturally suppose
they were at liberty to handle or play with, such owner
should expect such liberty to be taken.
II. That the creation and maintenance upon one's property
of such an instrumentality or enticement to the "ignorant
and unwary" is tantamount to an invitation to visit, inspect,
and enjoy, and under such circumstances the duty to "en-
deavor to protect from the dangers of the seductive instru-
ment or place follows as justly as though the invitation to
the ignorant and unwary had been expressed."
III. That if one artificially brings or creates upon his
premises a dangerous place or instrumentality which, from
its nature, has a tendency to attract the childish instincts
and impulses of normal children for play or amusement,
and at the same time is dangerous to them, a new duty is
imposed upon one maintaining such place or agency, namely,
in the exercise of an obvious social duty and the ordinary
offices of humanity, to take such reasonable pains, precau-
tions, and ordinary care, without becoming the insurer or
guarantor of the safety thereof . . . to see that such places
or instrumentalities are so safe-guarded that children be
[Vol. 17
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reasonably protected and not be injured in coming in contact
therewith while playing with it or coming in its vicinity.
IV. That although a dangerous place or thing "may not
have especial attraction for children by reason of their
childish instincts-yet where it is so left exposed that they
are likely to come in contact with it, and where their coming
in contact with it is obviously dangerous to them, the person
so exposing the dangerous thing should reasonably antici-
pate the injuries that are likely to happen to them ...
V. That a child under the age of seven years was conclusive-
ly presumed to be incapable of committing contributory
negligence, and that there was a prima facie presumption
that a child between the ages of seven and fourteen was
incapable of committing contributory negligence, but this
presumption was rebuttable ...
VI. That if the death of the child in this case was due to
the contributory negligence of the parents in allowing him to
go about without proper control and supervision, and such
parents are the beneficiaries, their contributory negligence
would bar recovery in this action. 90
The point raised in V91 merits some discussion. It appears to
be now settled that South Carolina has adopted as its test for
determining a child's capacity to be guilty of contributory negli-
gence the rule of the common law that a child under seven is
conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing a crime.
92
Also, from seven to fourteen there is a presumption that he is
incapable of contributory negligence. 93 The standard in this age
group being not whether a child acted as an ordinary prudent
child would have acted, but whether he acted as a child of his
age, capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experience would ordi-
90. Id. at 189-91, 154 S.E. at 124.
91. See generally Annot., 107 A.L.R. 4 (1937); supplemented by 174 A.L.R.
1080 (1948).
92. Herring v. Boyd, __ S.C. -, 140 S.E.2d 246 (1965); Chitwood v.
Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 156 S.E. 179 (1930) (dictum); King v. Holliday,
116 S.C. 463, 108 S.E. 186 (1921) ; Sexton v. Noll Constr. Co., 108 S.C. 516,
95 S.E. 129 (1918) (dictum) ; Dodd v. Spartanburg R.R., Gas & Electric Co.,
95 S.C. 9, 78 S.E. 525 (1913); and Mason v. Southern R.R., 58 S.C. 70, 36
S.E. 440 (1900).
93. Hollman v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 201 S.C. 308, 22 S.E.2d 892 (1942);
Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 156 S.E. 179 (1930) (dictum): State v.
Hanahan, 111 S.C. 58, 96 S.E. 667 (1918); Tucker v. Buffalo Cotton Mills,
76 S.C. 539, 57 S.E. 626 (1907) ; and Bridges v. Asheville & Spartanburg R.R.,
25 S.C. 24 (1886).
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narily act under the circumstances.9 4 The presumption in this
age group is only rebuttable however, and under the proper cir-
cumstances a judgment can be directed.95 Above the age of four-
teen in the absence of proof to the contrary, the legal presump-
tion is that the child is &ui juns, so as to be charged with con-
tributory negligence. 98
The rule in this state that an infant under seven is incapable
of contributory negligence becomes of critical importance when
the distinction between patent and latent defects is considered.
This distinction is based on the conclusive presumption that the
possessor of land may assume that all children know that some
conditions, fire, heights, etc., are dangerous. South Carolina
accepts this rule at least in regard to fire hazards. 9 7 Of course,
from the mere fact that an infant cannot negligently contribute
to his own injury by another, it does not follow that there is a
duty on the landowner to protect him, s for a duty can only
arise when harm is foreseeable. However, it would seem logical
that whether or not a dangerous condition was patent would be
immaterial in determining foreseeability where the injured child
was under seven years of age.99
In Bannister v. Poe Mfg. Co.,100 a small boy drowned in a
pond used for watering cattle. The pond was some six hundred
feet from a playground but was separated from it by a railroad
embankment. The pasture itself was fenced with three strands
of wire, and the company guards made efforts to keep children
out. The court held that the McLendon 1' case was directly in
point, and that, therefore, a verdict should have been directed for
the defendant. Mr. Justice Carter stated that the fence in ques-
tion was a sufficient exercise of care by the defendant, in that
it. was adequate to safeguard the average normal child of the
mill village from the danger. He concluded that to require the
company to drain or fence the pond itself, in the light of its use
for watering cattle, or to erect around the pasture an impossible
barrier, would be an entirely unreasonable burden.
94. Porter v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 590 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ; Hollman v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 201 S.C. 308, 22 S.E.2d 892 (1942) ; and Chitwood v.
Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 156 S.E. 179 (1930) (dictum).
95. Ibid.
96. Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 156 S.E. 179 (1930).
97. Hancock v. Aiken Mills, 180 S.C. 93, 185 S.E. 188 (1936).
98. See, e.g., Wilmont v. McPadden, 79 Conn. 367, 65 Atl. 157 (1906).
99. This problem would not arise in the majority of states since they do not
assign age limits for contributory negligence. See mipra note 91.
100. 162 S.C. 1, 160 S.E. 138 (1931).
101. McLendon v. Hampton Cotton Mills, 109 S.C. 238, 95 S.E. 781 (1917).
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In a very brief decision in Davenport 'v. Piedmont Mfg. Co., 1 0 2
the court held that the complaint which alleged that Piedmont
negligently maintained on its school playgrounds an attractive
and dangerous chute and ladder (sliding board) from which a
school child of six fell to her injury, stated a cause of action
for maintaining an attractive nuisance. The defense that the
school was under the exclusive management and control of the
school board was for answer, not demurrer.
In Hancock v. Aiken Mills, Inc.,1 3 a boy of twelve was burned
by a fire built on property rented by his parents from the mill.
The fire had been built by the defendant's workmen to warm
themselves while they repaired a chimney located on an adjoin-
ing lot. The court held that the attractive nuisance doctrine did
not apply. Mr. Justice Fishburne, speaking for the majority,
stated that from a careful analysis of the prior South Carolina
cases on the point that in order to recover the child must have
gone on to the property by reason of the temptation of the very
instrumentality of the attractive nuisance. In this case the boy
was at the fire merely at the request of one of the workmen in
order to run an errand, and was not in any way drawn to the
condition by a childish instinct for play or amusement. Also,
the court held that "a fire is ipso facto dangerous, and presents
a danger that is open, obvious, and not latent."'' 0 4 The court
concluded that there was no evidence that the plaintiff was
mentally deficient or lacking in judgment and that, therefore,
as a matter of law he was guilty of contributory negligence.
This case is the first one in this state in which the issue of the
implied invitation theory was squarely raised and answered.
The court's conclusion, while unfortunate, is at best dictum.
First, the facts in this case were not at all appropriate for an
application of the attractive nuisance doctrine for the simple
reason that the child was not a trespasser. Of course, elements
of the doctrine are helpful in determining negligence in cases
where the injured child was not a trespasser as indicating fore-
seeability, which is apparently what was done in the Daven-
port10 5 case; but implied invitation would be irrelevant. Second-
ly, while it is true that the quotation from Cooley on Torts'0 6
102. 169 S.C. 165, 168 S.E. 394 (1933).
103. 180 S.C. 93, 185 S.E. 188 (1936) (dissenting opinion by Carter, J.).
104. Id. at 107, 185 S.E. at 194.
105. Davenport v. Piedmont Mfg. Co., 169 S.C. 165, 168 S.E. 394 (1933),
106. COOLEY, TORTS 356 (2d ed. 1888).
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which based the doctrine on implied invitation had been cited
in previous cases, so also had Street's book'01 7 in which the author
attacks the fiction as arbitrary and unjust. Third, it is reason-
ably impossible to reconcile the often mentioned rule that the
special exception applies not only where the dangerous condition
is attractive but also where it is so exposed that harmful contact
is likely. And finally, the court confused the apparent holding
of the Sexton case' 08-that the child must be in some way in-
fluenced by the dangerous condition in order for injury to have
been foreseeable, and that the negligence must be a proximate
cause of the injury-by stating that it held that invitation is
necessary.
In Per i n! . Rainwater,10 9 the court held that the complaint
stated a cause of action under the attractive nuisance doctrine,
when it alleged that a seven year old girl, while attending danc-
ing school, stepped out on a poorly constructed fire escape that
was accessible from the dance hall and was killed when she
slipped through an opening. The court cited the Hart10 case to
the effect that the dangerous condition need not be easily
reached, but that it is sufficient if it be of such a nature that it
tempt or appeal to the venturesome or curious impulse of the
normal child, so that it can be easily put in reach.
It has been held that a fire escape is not an attractive nuisance
for the reason that it is impracticable to construct them so that
they will serve their purpose and yet be inaccessible to adven-
turesome children."' This reasoning would not apply to this
case, however, since the negligence is with a defect in the fire
escape, not its mere presence.
The case of Frye v. Elrod"2 is primarily concerned with
master-servant liability; however, the court held that whether
a pile of stacked lumber" 3 located near the plaintiff's home was
an attractive nuisance was a question for the jury.
The most recent case in this area is Everett v. I hite.114 A
small boy of five was injured when he fell into an excavation
filled with water at a house site. The defendant alleged that the
107. 1 STREET, FouNDATioNs OF LEGAL LTABILITY 160-61 (1906).
108. Sexton v. Noll Constr. Co., 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1918).
109. 186 S.C. 181, 195 S.E. 283 (1938).
110. Hart v. Union Mfg. & Power Co., 157 S.C. 174, 154 S.E. 118 (1930).
111. Heva v. Seattle School Dist., 110 Wash. 668, 188 Pac. 776 (1920).
112. 187 S.C. 233, 196 S.E. 884 (1938).
113. See generally annot., 28 A.L.R. 1254 (1949).
114. - S.C. -, 140 S.E.2d 582 (1965).
Vol. 17
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss3/4
complaint failed to state a cause of action on two grounds: One,
the condition was open and obvious and involved no latent peril
and two, there were no facts alleging that the plaintiff was
attracted to the peril. The court summarily dismissed the de-
fendant's first contention by stating that from the facts the
appearance of the hole was that of an ordinary puddle, and
therefore it was a hidden danger.
In deciding the appellants second contention the court finally
laid to rest most doubts as to the need for implied invitation in
South Carolina. Mr. Justice Brailsford stated that, parallel with
the attractive nuisance doctrine, the court had long recognized
a right of recovery to children from a dangerous condition, even
though it was not attractive, or the child an invitee or business
visitor, so long as it was exposed and obviously dangerous. He
also stated that the recognition given this latter rule in the
,Sexton case 1 5 showed that the decision did not rest upon im-
plied invitation. The court concluded by saying that, although
the Hancock case 1 6 appeared to support the appellant's conten-
tion as to an attractive nuisance, it did not apply to conditions
which were not attractive.
E. Conclusion
With the inclusion of the Everett case the basic criteria for a
landowner's duty to trespassing children is reasonably well
settled in South Carolina. The only major bone of contention
now is whether the court would require an implied invitation if
the dangerous condition where attractive rather than unattrac-
tive but so exposed that harmful contact is likely. It is difficult
for the writer to conceive of the South Carolina Supreme Court
holding such an obviously absurd and contradictory result.
Whether the condition can be seen from the borders of the prop-
erty as well as whether it is attractive is merely one of the
factors bearing on the basic issue of foreseeability of injury
under all the circumstances.
There is absolutely no reason for there to be two distinct
theories upon which recovery is allowed. If a dangerous condi-
tion is attractive, or, if not attractive, exposed, the same result
follows: injury may be foreseeable, depending upon many other
circumstances. While the summation in the Hart case 117 is an
115. Sexton v. Noll Constr. Co., 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1918).
116. Hancock v. Aiken Mills, 180 S.C. 93, 185 S.E. 188 (1936).
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excellent presentation of the relevant facts which should be
weighed, it is hoped that the court will return to the simple and
basic tort doctrine as expressed in the Bridget case n1 8 and be
done with such confusing and arbitrary distinctions:
Whether the instrumentality was itself a dangerous one;
[whether it was attractive]; whether, being dangerous and
capable of inflicting injury, it was located and left in an
exposed place, unguarded and unprotected; and especially
whether the party injured was mentally incapable of know-
ing and appreciating the danger, either from want of age
or otherwise, and of the impropriety of his intermeddling
with it, would all enter into the general question of neg-
ligence .... 119
FnANx L. TAmoR, JR.
118. Bridger v. Asheville & Spartanburg R.R., 25 S.C. 24 (1885).
119. Id. at 29.
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